Grading error reduces grower incentives
to increase prune quality
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Grading is important to ensure the
production of hlgh-quallty foods,
but It Is usually done with error,
distorting market signals and diminishing Incentives to produce
hlgh-quallty products. Size is the
main quality criterion for dried
prunes and the crucial characteristic In determining prune value. We
studied the economic effects of errors In commodity grading, focusing In particular on the Implications
of one-way (asymmetric) grading
errors, namely when small, lowquality product Is erroneously classified as high quality, but not vice
versa. In an application to the California prune Industry, we estimated
the extent to which large prunes are
undervalued and small prunes are
overvalued. We conclude that grading error means that prunes graded
as hlgh-quallty may not really be
hlgh-quallty prunes. The presence
of these Incorrectly graded prunes
depresses the prices that growers
are paid for hlgh-quallty prunes and
Increases the net returns for small
prunes. As a result, growers face
reduced Incentives to produce
larger prunes.
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Food demand in the United States is
relatively stable. As people's incomes
rise, they do not consume more food,
but they eat better, higher-quality
foods. The quality dimension of the
U.S. food industry has become increasingly important, especially in fruit and
vegetable markets where California is
the dominant producing state. The
most successful growers and marketers consistently provide high-quality
products to consumers.
.Grading of farm commodities is one
way to encourage production of highquality products. To improve the incentives to growers of large prunes,
the prune industry adopted payments
based upon five grades in 1996. Before
then, growers received one price for
their entire crop, based on the average
prune size in the sample.
If products of various quality are
commingled and receive a common
price based on average quality, it discourages growers from adopting the
costly production practices necessary
to produce the larger fruit that is
highly valued in the marketplace.
However, if the commodity is graded,
price premiums and discounts associated with grades provide incentives
for market participants to alter quality
in ways that consumers desire.

Unfortunately, grading is rarely
done perfectly. Grading errors can
emerge both because of sampling errors and from imperfect testing. We
investigated the one-way grading error caused by imperfect testing,
wherein low-quality product can receive a high-quality rating, but the
converse cannot occur. This type of
asymmetric error is the norm for sizebased grading methods. For example,
in systems used to grade or sort fruit,
vegetables, nuts or grain by size, the
product is conveyed across screens or
cylinders with holes of increasing size
or via diverging belts or rollers. Small
product can fail to fall into the correct
category, moving instead to a category
intended for larger product, but large
product cannot fall through screen
holes intended to capture the smaller
product.
We apply the analysis to the California prune industry, where prunes
are graded by size into one of five categories. Figure 1 is a schematic of the
grader used for California prunes. As
the figure suggests, small prunes may
not fall into their designated category
and may instead travel into categories
reserved for larger prunes, but large
prunes cannot fall into categories designated for smaller product. Therefore,
a portion of lower-quality prunes receives a higher-quality ranking and a
higher price, but the reverse cannot occur. We examined the effect of this
grading error on prices that growers
receive and on the incentives to adopt
cultural practices leading to increased
prune size.
A model of errors in grading
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Fig. 1. Dried Fruit Association prune grading system.
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We developed a theoretical model
to study the effects of grading error on
the price of a farm product that is
sorted and graded based on a single
quality characteristic, size, in which
the grading system is characterized by

~ About 6 weeks after bloom, prune
growers can shake some of the fruit off
the trees so the remaining prunes will
grow larger.

one-way measurement errors. One
outcome of this type of error is that the
measured quantity of products in each
grade is not the actual quantity of the
product meeting the grade standard.
We discuss the model in the context of the five grades, A, B, C, 0 and
V (undersize) now used for prunes
(fig. 1). Prunes receiving the A grade
will consist of actual grade A prunes,
as well as some lower-grade prunes
that end up in grade A. However,
prunes truly of grade A size cannot
tumble through a smaller screen, so all
true A prunes are graded correctly.
Prunes measured in grade B consist of
true grade B prunes plus smaller
prunes that failed to fall through their
designated screen. A similar story applies to grades C and O. The U or undersize grade will consist entirely of U
prunes because it is the lowest grade,
and larger prunes cannot fit through
the holes in the U screen.
We define Vi as the farm price that
would emerge for prunes of grade i =
A, B, C, 0, U in the absence of any
grading error, and refer to Vi as the
"value" of prunes correctly classified
into grade i. Vi is the processing
sector's willingness to pay per unit for
correctly graded prunes of grade i. The
actual price, Pi' paid to growers for all
grades except the lowest will be discounted, relative to the true value Vi'
because prunes measured as grade i
are "contaminated" by prunes from
the lower grades.
Because the lowest grade of prunes
cannot be contaminated, the grower
price for the lowest grade is equal to
its true market value. This means that
Pu = Vu' However, prunes measured
as grade 0 consist of commodity from
both grade 0 and grade V, because
some U prunes will fail to fall through
the V screen and instead fall through
the 0 screen, thereby masquerading as
D prunes. It can safely be assumed
that packers are aware of these grading errors, since they typically re-sort
prunes, after payments to growers are
determined, into more finely separated size categories. The presence of

undersized prunes should therefore
affect packers' willingness to pay
growers for grade 0 prunes. Packers
and growers negotiate prices for each
grade once a year, and there is no adjustment in prices to individual growers after delivery, based on the number of misgraded prunes. As a result,
the price paid to growers for grade 0
must represent a weighted average of
the true market values of grade 0 and
grade U prunes, with the weights corresponding to the relative quantities of
actual grade 0 and grade U prunes
that are classified as grade O.
Weighted-average pricing

The more accurate the grading process, the lower the probability of a
prune in the 0 screen being of size U
and therefore, the smaller will be the
discount (V D - P D) for grade O. The
grower prices for grades C, B and A
are similarly weighted averages of the
true market values of the prunes that
end up in those measured grades. The
grower price for grade C will be a
weighted average of the true values
for C, 0 and U prunes, and so on, for
prunes measured in grades B and A.
We wished to ascertain the reduction in prices (the difference between
the actual value, Vi' and the grower
price, Pi) for each grade due to mistakes in grading. In an expanded ver-

sion of this paper (Chalfant et a1.
1999), we show that if buyers and sellers have complete information about
the true distribution of prunes among
the five size categories, and also the
probabilities of grading errors, then
there is a simple linear relationship
linking the Pi'S and V/s. For prunes,
we observe the Pi'S (the prices actually
paid), and from them we can infer the
V/s (the underlying true values) and,
therefore, the extent to which grading
error depresses market prices.
The price discount for grade i is determined jointly by: (a) the extent to
which prunes from lower grades are
erroneously measured as grade i and
(b) the difference in value between
true grade i prunes and prunes of
lower grades. For example, the grower
price of grade B is discounted based
on the relative amounts of grade C, 0
and U prunes that receive a grade of B
and the differences in value between
grade B and those lower grades. The
more prevalent are the lower-grade
prunes among those graded as B, and
the lower the true value of these prunes
relative to grade B's true value, the
lower is the market price for grade B.
Discounts not the whole story

These price discounts do not tell the
entire story. Because the price a.
grower receives for prunes measured
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graded prunes that are
misclassified as grade A.
Thus, RA = P A < VA'
Offsetting effects on perunit revenue are present,
however, for prunes of the
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higher-quality intermediate grades, such as grade B, because
that grade can be contaminated by
Fig. 2. Relative frequencies for each
screen In Sample 1, by prune size.
prunes from grades C, D and V,
whereas there is only one higher
in grade i is a weighted average of the
grade for B prunes to migrate into.
Thus, the higher the intermediate
market value, Vi' of true grade i
prunes and the market values of
grade, the more likely that prunes of
lower-grade prunes that are classified
that grade will be undervalued.
incorrectly as grade i, the grower is
Growers will respond to the perpaid less than market value for the
unit revenue they receive for prunes of
portion of production that is graded
each grade, not their underlying
correctly for all grades except the low"true" values. Thus, the tendency to
est. However, the grower is paid more
overvalue small prunes and underthan market value for prunes that
value large prunes distorts grower intruly meet a lower grade standard, but centives in favor of producing smaller
end up in a higher grade.
prunes. There will be less investment
How do these effects play out on
in improving quality than when no
balance? We define Rj as the per-unit
price distortions exist.
revenue that a grower receives for
Empirical analysis
prunes that truly are of grade i, for i =
A, B, C, D and V. The extent to which
California produces nearly all U.S.
per-unit revenue deviates from true
prunes and about 70% of the world's
market value reflects the degree of un- supply. The harvesting of prunes occurs
dervaluation (Ri < V) or overvaluation from mid-August to mid-September,
(Rj > V). First, for prunes that are truly using a mechanical shaker attached to
of the lowest grade V, Rv is higher
the tree trunk. Next, prunes are dried,
than the actual value of the prunes,
cured and aerated for about 30 days.
Vv' because some V prunes end up be- Then, the fruit is delivered to a
ing measured and paid as grades D, C, packer's warehouse. Packers process
Band A. Second, prunes of the highest the dried prunes by rehydrating, grading, sizing, packaging and reinspectgrade, A, always earn less than their
ing to meet trade specifications. Size is
value, because all grade A prunes rethe main quality criterion for dried
ceive P A' which is discounted relative
to VA because of the presence of lower- prunes and the crucial characteristic in
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determining prune value. The largest
prunes are sold in gourmet retail
packs at a premium price. Moderately
large prunes can be pitted and sold as
pitted prunes, while the smallest
prunes are useful only for juice, paste
and other industrial products, and sell
for a lower price per pound.
Prunes in California are marketed
under both a federal and a state marketing order. The federal marketing
order authorizes the industry to regulate and set standards for the prune
grading system, with the Dried Fruit
Association (DFA) of California as the
inspection agent. Packers maintain
their own graders, and can set screen
lengths and sizes to suit their own
needs. However, official grading for
purposes of determining payments to
growers is done using a five-screen
grader. Packers take 40-pound
samples, one from each grower's shipment, to a DFA grading facility in
Yuba City. Prices paid for each shipment are based on the quantities of
prunes that fall into the five size categories. Payments to growers are not
adjusted based on further sorting that
may be conducted later by packers.
Each screen size on the grader consists of three screens that measure 2
square feet. Prunes that are smaller
than the diameter of the screen openings may fall through the holes and be
classified accordingly. The first screen
is designed to eliminate trash, while
the next four screens are for prune sizing (fig. 1). Before 1998, the V, D, C
and B screens had 23/32, 24/32, 26/
32, and 30/32-inch diameter holes, respectively. Prunes in the A category or
"overs" do not fall through any screen
and therefore go over the end of the
grader. Results from the grading process are summarized for each sample
on a grade sheet prepared by the DFA.

Oversupply of small prunes
Industry participants often complain of an "oversupply" of small
prunes. Prune size can be enhanced
through cultural practices, such as
pruning, shaker thinning and delaying
harvest. Field sizing, using a screen to
remove the smallest prunes from the
shipment before it is graded, can also
be used to eliminate the smallest
prunes and to avoid incurring the cost

of handling them. Growers have been
encouraged to adopt these practices,
with limited success to date.
Before 1996, growers received one
price for their entire crop, based on the
average prune size in the sample. The
adoption in 1996 of payments based
upon the grading system described
here was an attempt to provide more
incentives to growers to increase
prune size. A separate price is negotiated for the A, B, C and D grades, with
the V grade valued at zero. Growers'
payments are based on these prices
and the percentages of their DFAgraded sample that register in each of
the five grades.
Despite this change in pricing, the
problem of small prune oversupply
persists. In early 1998, the VSDA approved an increase to 24/32 inch for
the V screen as a way to remove more
small prunes from the salable market.
In addition, the sizes of the holes in
the D and C screens were raised to 26/
32 and 28/32 inches, respectively. Although these actions may help address
the imbalance in production, they do
not address the incentive problems
caused by grading error.
We evaluated the impact of grading
errors for the 1996 crop year. Specifically, for each grade, we sought to estimate the difference between the price
received by growers and the true market value (Pi - Vi)' and the average
farm revenue and the actual value
(R i - V). The Pi'S are the outcome of
negotiations between packers and the
Prune Bargaining Association (PBA)
and are known and fixed for the season. To estimate Vi and RjI we needed
information on the magnitude of grading error. For this purpose, we used
detailed information for two 40-pound
samples of prunes collected by the
PBA from a variety of Sacramento Valley sites, and conforming closely in
size distribution to the overall harvest.
After each PBA sample was graded
on the DFA grader, the weight of each
individual prune was recorded as the
number of prunes of that weight
needed to comprise a pound (Le., the
smaller the number per pound, the
larger the prune). For each prune in
the PBA samples, we knew which
screen it fell through and its actual
size. The measured and actual size dis-

tributions were thus known for both
40-pound samples. Actual prune size
was expressed in terms of weight, because the industry delineates actual
grades based on prune weight, even
though prunes are graded by size.
(Given the irregular shape of a typical
prune, it would be almost impossible
to measure its size to determine if, in
principle, it would have fit through a
smaller screen than it actually fell
through.)
For the first sample, each panel in
figure 2 shows the size distribution of
prunes falling through a given screen,
while the dividing lines indicate the
break points between grades. Figure 2
suggests that some prunes received a
grade that was lower than what they
apparently deserved, based on their
weight. For example, a prune's shape
may be such that it falls through the B
screen but weighs enough to be considered grade A. This appearance of
"undergrading" is merely a consequence of the DFA screens being
based on size (inches in diameter),
whereas the break points that the industry uses to classify grades (and that
we used to assign a true grade) are
based on weight (the number of
prunes per pound).
In the empirical work described below, we treat undergraded prunes as
though they actually belong to the
lower grade. However, we also repeated the analysis allowing for
undergrading, and the results were
similar to those reported here (results
available from the authors).
Grade sheets for 1996 stUdy

We also obtained the actual grade
sheets completed for all 1,487 samples
graded by the DFA in 1996. Each
grade sheet reports the total weight
and the average prune size in each of
the measured grades A, B, C, D and V,
based on the 40-pound sample taken
from each shipment after drying. We
used the detailed information from
our two 40-pound PBA samples to infer the size distributions for each of
the actual shipments. Based on analysis of the PBA sample data, it was reasonable to model the size distributions
for the prunes within each measured
grade using the Gamma probability
distribution. In contrast to the familiar

Normal distribution (the bell-shaped
curve), the Gamma distribution allows
for asymmetry around the mean in the
distribution of prune sizes - a characteristic that was apparent from our
analysis of the PBA samples (fig. 2).
We estimated a unique Gamma distribution for each measured grade in
each of the 1,487 shipments.
For each shipment, we had a set of
estimated probability distributions
(one for each grade) describing the
size distribution of individual prunes
in each measured grade. By evaluating
the estimated distribution at the break
points between actual grades, we were
able to estimate the proportions of
prunes of an actual grade that were
measured in each of the five grades
(tables 1 and 2).
Table 1 contains the proportion of
prunes measured in each grade based
on the DFA grader and our estimate of
the true proportions in each grade for
the entire 1996 crop. Differences between the actual and measured proportions are readily apparent, but the
degree of measurement error is further
clarified in table 2. Each row of table 2
refers to the actual prune grade, and
each column refers to the measured
prune grade. Individual cells in the
table contain the proportions of each
row grade that received the grade
given by the corresponding column
grade. The rightmost entries in each
row thus represent proportions of correctly graded prunes. Every other entry represents a percentage of prunes
of each actual grade migrating to
higher grades.
TABLE 1. Proportions of shipments by weight
as measured and as actually belonging
to each grade
Grade
A
B

C
0
U

Measured

Actual

0.36
0.44
0.13
0.04
0.03

0.29
0.42
0.18
0.06
0.05

TABLE 2. Shares of actual grade products classified (by weight) Into each measured grade
Actual
grade

A
B
C
0
U

Measured grade
ABC
0

1.00
0.15
0.02
0.00
0.00

0.85
0.42
0.12
0.02

0.56
0.50
0.17

U

0.38
0.25
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Fig. 3. Revenue-value spreads by average

size.
Table 2 shows that the probability
of grading errors is greatest in the
lower grades. This result is not surprising, because prunes in these
grades have the greatest opportunity
to migrate into higher grades. All Aquality prunes were graded correctly
by construction of the grading process,
and 85% of B-quality prunes were
graded correctly, with the remaining
15% masquerading as A-quality
prunes. However, only 56% of Cquality prunes were graded correctly, with 42% masquerading as B
prunes. Only 38% of true D-quality
prunes were graded as 0, with 50%
and 12% migrating into the C and B
screens, respectively.

because Sunsweet prunes are also
graded by the DFA and, hence, are
subject to the grading errors described here.
PBA grower price (P), actual
value (V), and average grower
revenue (R.)I for each grade are
,
presented in columns 2, 3 and 4 of
table 3. The difference between
grower prices and actual values
for each grade, Pi - Vi ' indicates
the extent to which grower prices
were discounted because of grading error, and these differences
are listed in column 5 of table 3.
For all grades except the lowest, U, the grower price is lower
than the actual value. The price of
grade A prunes is lower than its
true value by 2.28 cents/lb., or by
4%, while B-grade prunes are undervalued by 3.43 cents/lb., or
7.7%.The difference between the average grower revenue and the actual
value of prunes in each grade is shown
in the last column of table 3. Since Agrade prunes cannot masquerade as
any other grade, their average grower
revenue equals their price, and the difference is 2.28 cents/lb.
The average grower revenue received for undersized prunes is higher
(by over 6 cents/lb.) than the actual
value of zero. The average grower revenue is lower than the actual value for
grade B (by 3.4%), but higher for
grades C and 0 (by 16.7% and 73.2%,

TABLE 3. Grower price, actual value and average farm revenue for each grade
Grade

Grower
price

A
B
C

54.25
41.00
21.75

U

7.00
0.00

Grower revenues

The information contained in tables
1 and 2, along with the actual grower
prices, Pi' for each grade, enable us to
solve for the true values, Vi' of each
grade. In the California prune industry, grower prices are determined by
one of two mechanisms, depending
upon whether the grower sells through
Sunsweet Growers, a cooperative, or
one of several independent handlers.
Prices paid by the independents are
determined through negotiations with
the PBA, while Sunsweet maintains its
own pricing schedule. Our analysis focuses solely on the PBA prices, although
our results apply broadly to Sunsweel
70

respectively). The negative spread for
grade B indicates, for example, that
the decrease in average grower revenue for grade B prunes associated
with the migration of lower grades
into grade B more than offsets the gain
in revenue associated with some of the
B prunes being classified as grade A.
As predicted, the opposite effect dominates for the lower grades, exacerbating the incentive problem.
We investigated the effects of grading error on the distribution of income
among growers. Differences across
growers were hypothesized to cause
some growers (those with a higher
share of correctly graded prunes in
grade A, for instance) to lose revenue
due to grading error, while others (for
example, those with a preponderance
of smaller prunes that could move up
in grade) would gain. We calculated a
measure of the revenue-value
"spread" for every shipment, defined
as the difference between the revenue
per unit received by the grower and
the actual value per unit of the shipment, averaged across all grades. A
negative number for the spread represents value not captured by the
grower, an undervaluation, whereas a
positive spread indicates grower revenue exceeded the shipment's true
value, an overvaluation. These revenue-value spreads varied between 2.5 cents/lb. and 6.5 cents/lb. for the
1,487 shipments in 1996.

Actual
value

Avg. farm
revenue

Grower price
minus actual value

.......................................................... cents per pound

o

56.53
44.43
26.09
10.70
0.00

54.25
42.96
30.45
18.54
6.21

-

Avg. farm revenue
minus actual value
.

2.28
3.43
4.34
3.70
0.00

(- 4%)
(- 8%)
(- 17%)
(- 35%)

- 2.28 (- 4%)
- 1.47 (- 3%)
4.36 (17%)
7.84 (73%)
6.21

TABLE 4. Impact of shaker thinning on prune size distribution

Grade

Current grading system
Unthinned
-=-Th-'i-nn-e-'dShare of crop in each measured grade

0.11
0.45
0.28
C
0.09
o
0.07
U
4.3
Yield (tons/acre)
$2,676
Total revenue per acre
$1,166
Total costs per acre
$1,510
Net profll per acre
$365/acre (24%)
Returns to thinning

A
B
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0.39
0.46
0.10
0.02
0.Q3
3.2
$2,717
$843
$1,874
$499/acre (34%)

No grading error
-'U"""n-th-I-nn-e-d
-T--h-:-In-n-edShare of crop In each actual grade
0.07
0.38
0.32
0.12
0.10
4.3
$2,633
$1,166
$1,467

0.34
0.48
0.13
0.03
0.03
3.2
$2,809
$843
$1,966

The 1,487 shipments were divided
into three groups according to the average prune size of the shipment. The
distribution of revenue-value spreads
for the first group of shipments those with average sizes in the grade
A range - is shown in the first panel
of figure 3. These shipments were
never overvalued, and were almost always undervalued. The second panel
in figure 3 shows that the distribution
of spreads for shipments whose average prune size was in grade B is
roughly centered at zero, meaning
about half of these shipments were
overvalued and half undervalued. The
third panel in figure 3 shows the distribution of spreads for shipments
whose average sizes were in grades C
or D. Only 7% of these shipments were
undervalued, with about 80% of the
shipments generating revenue in excess of their actual value. These figures
provide further evidence that growers
who produce relatively small prunes
gain at the expense of growers of large
prunes.
Further support for this conclusion was provided by a regression
analysis, which generated a positive
and statistically significant relationship between the average prune size
in the shipment (expressed as the
number of prunes needed to make a
pound) and the price spread. We
were able to explain 50% of the
variation in revenue-value spreads
across shipments based solely upon
average prune size in the shipment.

Importance of grading errors
How important are these errors in
influencing growers' production practices, such as shaker thinning, to increase prune size? To explore this
question, we evaluated the return to
shaker thinning, based on 1996 prices,
under current grading practices and a
hypothetical regime of no grading error. We obtained data on shaker thinning from a trial conducted by the
PBA, where a representative orchard
was chosen and one row was mechanically thinned, and a sample from the
eventual harvest was graded on the
DFA grader. An adjacent row was
treated as a control and a sample from
its unthinned harvest was also submitted to the DFA grader. The mea-

sured size distribution from the
thinned and unthinned rows are reported in table 4, as are the estimated
actual distribution for each row,
which we derived using the estimated Gamma distributions.
Information regarding revenues
and costs under each scenario is summarized in table 4. Although shaker
thinning improves the size distribution of the harvest, it also reduces
yield, as shown. Total revenue was
calculated using actual PBA prices, Pi'
for the current grading system and the
actual values, Vi' for the hypothetical
regime with no grading error. Considering both the cost and revenue effects, the shaker-thinned crop yielded
$365 more net profit per acre than the
unthinned crop, given current grading
practices. The return to shaker thinning under no grading error was estimated to be $499 per acre, an increase
of 34% over the return with grading
error. We conclude that eliminating or
reducing grading error would increase
growers' incentives to shaker-thin
their orchards.
In summary, our results show that
grading error causes large prunes to
be undervalued relative to small
prunes, and growers who produce
relatively large prunes to subsidize
those who produce relatively small
ones. These findings are consistent
with the pattern of "oversupply" of
small prunes in recent years.
They also illustrate that continuing
to produce relatively greater numbers
of small prunes, rather than, for example, shaker thinning to produce
larger prunes, may well be a rational
response to current incentives.

Adding screens and premiums
The industry can partially address
the problem of oversupply of small
prunes by improving the accuracy of
the grading process. Examples include
increasing screen length or adding additional screens on the DFA grader.
Alternatively, the industry might
consider a graduated payment system
that offers premiums and discounts
based on average prune size within
each measured grade, rather than a
single price per grade, as is the current
practice. For example, Sunsweet
Growers use a pricing schedule with

As an Incentive to Improve the overall qualIty of the prune supply, growers are paid a
premium for larger prunes. Prunes are
graded by size. Grade A prunes, the largest,
are considered the highest quality.

many pricing gradations (15 for the
1997 crop) based on a measured size
count of the delivery.
Although measured size counts will
be subject to error and large prunes
will, accordingly, be undervalued by
Sunsweet, the use of this many pricing
gradations (in contrast to five in the
PBA schedule) helps to minimize the
impact of grading error for Sunsweet.
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